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Analysis: Attacks in Iraq will outlive al-Zarqawi

BY MOHAMAD BAZZI | Newsday Middle East Correspondent

June 9, 2006

Spokesman of Multi-National Force-Iraq Major General Bill Caldwell speaks during a press conference next to a picture of the killed leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Baghdad, Iraq. (Getty Images Photo / June 8, 2006)

BEIRUT, Lebanon - Despite the death of its most visible leader, the insurgency in Iraq will likely go on.

The killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi could hamper his supporters' ability to carry out suicide bombings and other attacks. It might even splinter his group, al-Qaida in Iraq, and set off a deadly power struggle over succession. But al-Zarqawi's demise is unlikely to affect the dozens of other groups involved in the grinding guerrilla war that he helped instigate.

"These groups will continue their attacks because al-Zarqawi represents an idea, and that idea will not die with him," said Jamal Abdel Jawad, an expert on Islamic militancy, based in Cairo. "Even al-Zarqawi's group can recover from this blow. ... It will need some time to reorganize itself and to select a new leadership."

Since the insurgency began in July 2003, it has been fueled by a mix of former officials in Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime and Islamic militant volunteers from neighboring countries. The ex-Baathists, who are mainly members of Iraq's Sunni minority, are believed to be responsible for most attacks against U.S. forces, while the foreign Sunni militants make up a large portion of suicide bombers targeting Iraqi civilians.

Al-Zarqawi had claimed responsibility - or was blamed by U.S. and Iraqi officials - for a majority of the bloodiest bombings, kidnappings and beheadings of foreigners in Iraq since 2004. U.S. officials say he masterminded a terror network in Iraq at the behest of Osama bin Laden, but al-Zarqawi has shown a tendency to operate independently through his own militant groups.

How important was he?

Ever since he emerged as the insurgency's public face in 2004, U.S., Iraqi and Arab officials have debated whether al-Zarqawi's role was inflated - both by his own claims and by the U.S. military's.

In July 2004, U.S. officials raised the reward for information leading to al-Zarqawi's arrest or killing to $25 million - equal to the bounty on bin Laden's head. The Bush administration has consistently labeled al-Zarqawi as the main force behind the insurgency.

But since last year, several Iraqi security officials told Newsday, the rebellion has been driven more by former Baathists and members of Hussein's security services and less by foreign Islamic fighters. And while Iraqi and U.S. forces made important arrests in al-Zarqawi's network, that did little to dampen the insurgency. The officials say this underscores their assessment that al-Zarqawi was taking credit for more attacks than his supporters were actually carrying out.

In recent months, Iraqi officials say, there has been a rift between Iraqi insurgents and foreign fighters allied with Jordanian-born al-Zarqawi. In response, al-Zarqawi announced in January that his group had joined the Shura Council of Mujahideen, an alliance of seven insurgent groups led by an Iraqi named Abdullah al-Baghdadi. Intelligence officials interpreted it as a move by al-Zarqawi to put an Iraqi stamp on his movement.

"With al-Zarqawi's death, this council might splinter into even smaller groups," said Diaa Rashwan, a specialist on Islamic militants at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo. "The entire infrastructure of foreign fighters in Iraq might be weakened."

Al-Zarqawi, a militant from the Sunni branch of Islam, targeted Iraq's Shia majority in hopes of instigating a civil war. Since 2004, insurgents bombed Shia mosques, wedding parties and religious ceremonies across Iraq. They also relentlessly attacked the Shia-dominated police and army. While there is no exact death toll, several thousand Shias are believed to have died in insurgent bombings and other attacks.

This sectarian conflagration may prove to be al-Zarqawi's most enduring legacy in Iraq. "He killed Iraqi civilians, and especially the Shia, in a way that no other militant had done," Rashwan said. "He took it to such an unprecedented level that other militants began to criticize him."

Rashwan noted that al-Qaida has refrained from attacking Shia civilians in Afghanistan, in an effort to prevent a backlash from the wider Muslim world. "But al-Zarqawi did not care about the wider Muslim audiences," he said.

Iraq's most revered Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, has long urged his followers not to retaliate against Sunnis. But as attacks on Shia civilians mounted, Shia militias and vigilantes began to fight back last year with tit-for-tat killings. Some Shia militias operate within the Iraqi security forces.

Iraqi leaders point to a January 2005 letter purportedly written by al-Zarqawi in which he appealed to bin Laden for help in setting off a civil war through bombing Shia institutions. Al-Zarqawi argued that car bombings alone were not enough to plunge Iraq into a full-scale war: The attacks needed to prompt a Shia backlash.

"So the solution, and only God knows, is that we need to bring the Shia into the battle," said the letter, intercepted by Iraqi security officials. "It is the only way to prolong the duration of the fight between the infidels and us."

Months later, bin Laden's top deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, sent a letter, also intercepted, urging al-Zarqawi to scale back his attacks on Shias.

Anticipating the fallout

One major question after al-Zarqawi's death is whether there will be fewer attacks against Shia civilians. Some analysts say al-Zarqawi's followers might lash out at Shias even further to avenge their leader's death.

"After a short time, we will see them active again, perhaps even with the same level of intensity and violence," Jawad said.

But others are more hopeful that al-Zarqawi's death will provide an opening for the new Iraqi government to reach out to Sunni leaders in western Iraq, where al-Zarqawi's supporters became entrenched.

"Al-Zarqawi and his people took some Sunni areas hostage. No local leader could stand up to them," said Ali Dabagh, a Shia member of Iraq's parliament.

"We could slowly see a change where Sunni leaders would be able to engage the new Iraqi government. There won't be someone like al-Zarqawi to terrorize them."