Cyr: The North Korean diplomacy tightrope

Arthur I. Cyr is the author of "After the Cold War." This is from Scripps Howard News Service.

The spectacular failure of North Korea's latest missile launch last week is cause for puzzlement more than alarm. For nearly two decades, Pyongyang has shifted back and forth between apparent accommodation and bombastic hard line. Indeed, a parade on Sunday included what was billed as a new long-range missile.

This return to confrontation has taken place even before North Korea could reap any benefits from an indicated return to cooperation. On Feb. 28, North Korea's official news agency and the U.S. State Department jointly announced that the Pyongyang regime would cease uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons tests, and permit inspection of nuclear facilities.

In return, the United States would resume shipments of substantial humanitarian food relief. Friday's missile test predictably led to cessation of the shipments. Even in relatively closed North Korea, news is leaking out to undernourished people that anticipated provisions are being snatched away.

The test missile, which disintegrated in flight, provided monumental public embarrassment to the isolated communist regime, already notorious for economic mismanagement. There is no way this fiasco can help Pyongyang, either at home or abroad.

Under the circumstances, the cautious public statements of President Barack Obama and other administration representatives, in reaction to Pyongyang's latest olive branch, are fully vindicated. Obama's tough statements at the recent Seoul nuclear summit regarding defense of South Korea clearly were also justified.

How do we explain the apparent schizophrenia in Pyongyang?

We may be witnessing an intense power struggle there, encouraged by the ineffectiveness of Kim Jong Un, the young, newly installed leader. Trigger-happy hard-liners who launched the incredibly embarrassing missile may unintentionally strengthen moderate factions.

Cracks in the regime's rigid face provide openings for diplomacy. Washington's best course is to continue to be receptive to concrete moves from North Korea toward reason, but also to emphasize South Korea's leadership. That country's extraordinary economic success is grounded in manufacturing strength, a rapidly expanding global market and democracy. The extensive business ties of South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak can be utilized; extremely limited trade between North and South might be increased.

Previous famine in North Korea argues for initiatives led by South Korea to expand nongovernmental donations of food and other humanitarian assistance. United Nations involvement would reinforce this opportunity.

The high stakes involved are obvious. The Korean War of 1950-53 took an estimated 1 million lives in total, including from both halves of Korea, as well as from China and the United States. It brought direct combat between American and Chinese forces and devastated the Korean peninsula. In U.S. politics, the conflict destroyed public support for the Truman administration and fed anti-communist hysteria.

Another war could devastate the Koreas once again, greatly disrupt international politics -- and might go nuclear. The United States is engaged militarily in Afghanistan and other parts of the globe, and planned Pentagon budget cuts will leave even fewer forces for a possible war in Korea -- although the U.S. presence in Asia is expanding slightly.

Over the years, Pyongyang has been effective at creating crises, sometimes approaching the brink of war, only to step back in return for substantial economic aid. For Washington and its allies, negotiation has been frustrating, and at times agonizing. But war has been averted and stability maintained.