How Trump's peace talks failed in Afghanistan 

The Trump administration's peace agreement between the Afghan government and the Taliban has been flawed from the start, as it has ignored Pakistan's role in Afghanistan. Indeed, it has been a critical mistake by both the United States and Afghanistan to continue to include Pakistan in these negotiations, as Pakistan's aim has been to try to turn Afghanistan into its Islamic satellite. The Trump administration even failed to remember the lesson from 2009 when Pakistan frustrated the Obama administration's negotiations with the Taliban as Pakistan's main concern was to safeguard and advance its interests.

Pakistan's vision has always been simple: If peace negotiations fail, then Pakistan wins, as it continues to influence the country through the Taliban; and if the peace negotiations succeed, then Pakistan also wins, as its influence will extend to a power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and a very weak Afghan government. An Afghanistan dominated by Pakistan, through either reality, is a safe haven for radical Islamic movements, including al Qaeda and ISIS, and from which they are able to launch attacks against the United States and Europe. But if the United States withdraws its personnel and infrastructure, it will have little leverage to influence that landscape, and to return, as Pakistan will not open a supply route and Russia is no longer an option.

While the war in Afghanistan is deeply unpopular with the American people, because of its devastating loss of life and the massive money spent, the incoming Biden administration needs to pull out of the failed Trump-Afghan peace talks. Peace with the Taliban does not lead to a favorable outcome for the United States, and while the status quo is far from optimistic, the consequences from either an Afghanistan dominated by Pakistan or an Afghanistan without the support of the American military is far worse.

From the 1960s, the Pakistani Army has been influenced by the military doctrine of strategic depth, whose origin and justification is not in Afghanistan but in India. After the loss of its eastern wing, now known as Bangladesh, the Pakistani Army had to reconsider its strategy in respect to India. For Pakistan, Afghanistan thus became an area from where the Pakistani Armed Forces could withdraw, regroup and stage a counterattack. But this strategy would require a friendly Afghan government which would be willing to see its territorial sovereignty violated in case of a War between India and Pakistan.

The success of jihad and the mujahideen against Soviet troops in Afghanistan led the Pakistani Army to use them against India in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan's objective was to make those territories impossible to govern and to force the deployment of as many Indian troops to combat a local insurgency, while reducing India's capacity for a conventional conflict between both countries. These plans were put into effect in 1988, and in order to deny Pakistani involvement, the insurgents were trained in Afghanistan. But these plans required an Afghanistan that was friendly or at least incapable to confront Pakistan.

Afghanistan has always viewed the Pashtuns in Pakistan as part of the same Pashtun nation. So, during the Presidency of Muhammed Zia-al-Huq, Pakistan sought to control Pashtun nationalism in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, along with implementing a policy of Islamization. Then, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of the Central Asian republics, Afghanistan became a gateway for their energy markets. But the fall of the communist regime in Afghanistan, and the emergence of a civil war, frustrated Pakistan's Central Asian ambitions. Nevertheless, when the Taliban surged in Kandahar, it became Pakistan's best bet. With the Taliban, Pakistan finally obtained the means for the doctrine of strategic depth.

In the aftermath of 9/11, Pakistan was pressured to break its relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan, and to support the Afghan government instead. But Pakistan has allowed the tribal regions on the border to become a sanctuary for thousands of Taliban militants. The Pakistani ISI also has been involved in terrorist attacks inside Afghanistan, in particular against Indian interests. Pakistan has always perceived the Afghan government in Kabul to have a small chance of survival once it no longer has international support. And the increasing Indian presence in Afghanistan has led Pakistan to maintain a strong relationship with the Taliban.

While the doctrine of strategic depth has evolved and adapted according to the times, there should be little doubt that the Taliban is still a tool for Pakistan's aspirations. It is clear that the Pakistani military considers Afghanistan an extension of their battle plans in its conflict with India, and it has been a grave mistake to involve Pakistan in the U.S.-led negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

While neither total victory or peace might be possible in Afghanistan, with U.S. forces still on the ground, Washington can forge an outcome more preferable to its interests and its security.

Carlo J.V. Caro, a U.S. foreign policy and terrorism researcher, holds advanced degrees in security studies and Islamic Studies from Columbia University. This piece is excerpted from a piece published by The Diplomat.