The high cost of Japan's quest

Janis Mimura is an assistant professor of history at Stony Brook University and the author of "Planning for Empire: Reform Bureaucrats and the Japanese Wartime State."

Over the past two weeks, as the world has watched with a mixture of sympathy and fear, Japan has reeled from its triple earthquake-tsunami-nuclear disaster. While the scope of the tragedy continues to unfold -- most recently with concerns about drinking water in areas outside the Fukushima plant and a leak within it -- the horrible episode points to the disturbing problem of Japan's unquestioned faith in science and technology.

Both today and in the past, Japan's leaders have maintained an idealistic faith in technology to solve the nation's problems. During World War II, Japan looked to overcome its resource deficiencies by devising synthetic substitutes for resources that it lacked -- especially oil. Leaders believed that through synthetic oil and other raw materials, advanced military and civilian technology, and superior organization, Japan would become a first-class power and the leader of Asia.

This national ambition and reverence for technology have spurred each other on throughout the country's history. Following Japan's emergence as a modern state in 1868, its leaders pursued the goal of making Japan a "rich country, strong army" (fukoku kyohei) that could rival the West.

Drawing upon the lessons of World War I, Japan's leaders began to view the mobilization of technology as the key to achieving this mandate. The military believed that in order to prepare Japan for the next "total war," it must not only mechanize its forces and adopt the latest military technology, but also achieve self-sufficiency.

In 1931, the Japanese army invaded Manchuria in northeastern China and created the puppet state of Manchukuo. Together with Japanese bureaucrats, researchers and industrialists, the army embarked upon an ambitious program to develop heavy industry, extract raw materials and promote scientific research. In search of resources, it subsequently invaded China and Indochina.

In response, the United States imposed a full embargo on oil and other imports to Japan. Japan then launched an unsuccessful war against the United States and began to secure the perimeter of its so-called Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Science and technology had provided a false sense of security and fueled ambitious dreams of empire and victory in war. The end result, of course, is the stuff of history: Allied air raids and two atomic bombs, which leveled cities and left nearly 9 million Japanese homeless, resulting in sickness, starvation and death -- not to mention the mass suffering inflicted on the other countries in Asia.

And yet today, Japan is a technological superpower and one of the wealthiest nations in the world. Since World War II, it has excelled by again investing heavily in research and technology, this time becoming a leader in the automotive and consumer electronics industries, robotics, semiconductors and optics. It also has ambitions to become a major player in aerospace research and space exploration.

To sustain that high level of productivity, research and consumption, Japan has a profound dependence on a new synthetic oil substitute: nuclear power.

In 2008, Japan completed seven new nuclear reactors, making it the third largest consumer of nuclear power behind the United States and France. The Fukushima reactor catastrophe makes it clear, however, that this dependence comes at a significant cost.

In the same way that Emperor Hirohito announced Japan's defeat on Aug. 15, 1945, and asked the people to "endure the unendurable," his son, Emperor Akihito, made a televised speech on March 16, 2011, and asked for the people's support to "overcome these difficult times." Emperor Akihito's broadcast, together with the tragic scenes of devastation and looming nuclear catastrophe, make comparisons between the ongoing disaster and Japan's defeat in World War II inevitable.

But the destruction is just one similarity. Japanese leaders, both during World War II and recently, receive low marks for their handling of disasters.

During the war, Japan lacked powerful leaders who could unify the competing factions, boost morale and bring a timely end to the conflict. In current times, particularly in the days after the quake, Prime Minister Naoto Kan has confirmed any doubts about his political inexperience and inability to provide strong leadership at a time of national crisis. The very fact of Emperor Akihito's appearance suggested a real leadership vacuum -- and the government's desperation.

Perhaps worse, the government today, as in the past, lacks accountability to its people. The problem is deep-rooted, reflecting Japan's strong bureaucratic tradition and tendency to view politics as the internal affair of political and business elites, which continues despite the democratic reforms after World War II.

Japan's defeat in 1945 ought to have compelled the Japanese to reflect upon what went wrong and what might be avoided in the future. Defeat has no meaning unless one draws lessons from it. But the country's ongoing hunger for scientific dominance, coupled with its lack of political leadership and accountability, suggests the Japanese have not fully learned their lessons. The resource-poor country's relentless pursuit of wealth and technological prowess has inflicted tremendous suffering on its own people and the people of Asia.

Discussion of the real costs and benefits of national ambition have been censored or pushed aside. As the Japanese now begin the process of mourning, reconstruction and nuclear cleanup, they should reconsider the high price of wealth and power, and engage in an open dialogue about the real meaning of national interest, prosperity and well-being.