Was the recent plane mishap a Boeing problem or a regulatory problem?

First, let us all express relief that the latest urgent wake-up calls about airplane safety spring from an incident that cost no lives and caused no serious injuries. The still-terrifying details of Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, as revealed so far, are appropriately ringing multiple alarms for both the aviation industry and its assigned regulators, alarms of a kind that unfortunately we typically hear after tragedies.

On Jan. 5, six minutes into its flight out of Portland, Oregon, a “door plug” tore away from the jet at 16,000 feet, decompressing the cabin and commencing a dangerous 14-minute episode that ended with a safe return to the airport. “Door plug” is the term for the panel that fills the space in a plane’s fuselage where an exit door isn’t deemed necessary. This one was later found by a schoolteacher in his backyard along with two cellphones and a headrest; all were sucked out of the damaged aircraft and thankfully hit no one on the ground.

Experts declared it especially fortunate that nobody was seated in the window seat next to the panel — such a person might have been pulled out of the plane or quickly suffocated — and that this occurred before the jet reached full cruising altitude where a sudden loss of cabin pressure would have been more severe. There were 171 passengers and six crew members on board.

WORRISOME WARNINGS

A burgeoning probe by the National Transportation Safety Board goes in several worrisome directions. For one, warning lights were previously triggered on the same brand-new Boeing 737 Max 9 — including each of the two days before the door plug blew out. The NTSB will have to determine what the electronic signals should have told pilots, crew or maintenance personnel about safety risks.

Perhaps more disturbing is a strange-sounding restriction placed on use of this plane. The Jan. 5 trip that was supposed to go from Portland to Ontario, California, would be over land. NTSB chair Jennifer Homendy said maintenance crews had checked the plane in Portland and cleared it to fly — but the airline decided not to use it for the long route to Hawaii over water so it “could return very quickly to an airport” if a warning light appeared. How was this a sound policy?

Other critical questions range far beyond airline operation and inspection. The safety issues reach into the design and manufacture of the Max 9 by Boeing, and its fuselages and door plugs by Spirit AeroSystems Holdings Inc., a 2005 spinoff of Boeing unrelated to Spirit Airlines. United Airlines reports finding loose bolts on similar panels on Max 9 jets. Alaska Airlines reports “loose hardware” on the same model. More than 170 Max 9’s have been grounded, in some cases crimping service.

Yes, we're talking about Boeing again. But the systemic problem of air safety is even bigger than one industry giant. Flight 1282 resurfaces issues long raised about the role of the Federal Aviation Administration, which critics consider too beholden to the aviation industry.

SPOTLIGHT ON FAA

Presumably under political pressure from the White House and some lawmakers, the FAA on Friday suddenly bulked up its message on the mishap with an implied acknowledgment of its own governance problems. FAA Administrator Mike Whitaker said the practice of “delegating” key safety oversight to aviation companies themselves would be “reexamined.” An audit would be launched of Boeing's production-line troubles. An “independent third party” might be called in to enforce the giant company's quality assurance and inspections.

The last few years are relevant. Two crashes of Boeing Max 8 planes — involving Ethiopian Airlines and Indonesia’s Lion Air — killed a total of 346 people in 2018 and 2019. These involved the plane’s electronic flight-control system, which didn’t work as expected. Eventually, the company paid $2.5 billion to settle charges of a conspiracy to defraud the FAA.

From all we know so far, the Max 8 and Max 9 problems and the way they’ve been handled are unrelated.

In 2019, the U.S. was among the last of numerous nations to ground the jets, after suggesting there was no reason to do so. China was among the first. Has the FAA in the years since become faster, or more alert, or more mobilized to react to this kind of crisis?

Maybe not. A lawsuit filed weeks before the Jan. 5 incident by investors in fuselage manufacturer Spirit AeroSystems is concerning. Plaintiffs in the case cite “sustained quality failures” in the manufacturer's products. Whether the claims, which have been prepared over many months, should have prompted a more immediate bureaucratic response is one more question the FAA must answer. Did it take a near-disaster to bring attention to a flaw that grounded 171 Max 9's?

The FAA website says its mission is “to provide the safest, most efficient aerospace system in the world.” Ultimately, it is up to elected officials in Washington to make sure the FAA has the will, leadership, staff and resources to fulfill its lofty goal. 

Hopefully, the right public and private actions will occur in time to avert any looming disasters. Otherwise, we'll just be hoping to stay lucky.