Letters: LIRR needs to perform better

Thanks for your article indicating how fragile the Long Island Rail Road's system is ["LIRR taken by storm," News, Oct. 2]. Next time, I will be careful not to sneeze either on the train or in a station, for fear of knocking out the entire system east and west of Jamaica.

Jay Becker, Syosset

Intelligent LIRR riders can seek alternative means of travel to get around service disruptions ["Commuter nightmare," News, Sept. 30, and "What went wrong," News, Oct. 1].

Those in the know take the subway, using either the No. 7 line to Flushing, the F line to Jamaica's 169th Street, the J/Z and E lines to Archer Avenue, or the A line to Far Rockaway. Long Island Bus provides connecting service that passes by or within several blocks of various LIRR stations on different branches. A simple transfer to a northbound or southbound bus route will also provide connections to many other neighborhoods. At the Hempstead bus terminal, you can transfer.

Why stress yourself waiting for the LIRR during incidents, when you can ride the bus? People can also consider telecommuting or an alternative work schedule to avoid the crowds.

Larry Penner, Great Neck
 

I am astounded by the ignorance and obvious technical naiveté of LIRR management. LIRR President Helena Williams' comment -- "We work hard to ensure that things are grounded so that we don't attract lightning" ["What went wrong," News, Oct. 1] -- epitomizes that ignorance of lightning and how to protect from its effects.

Grounding does not ward off lightning. Effective grounding helps dissipate the high energy contained in a lightning bolt, while reducing damage to equipment should a strike occur. The key word here is effective. Nothing exists that can eliminate lightning strikes entirely, although a number of purveyors of gadgets peddle such at high prices, claiming unproven technologies embellished by technical gibberish. Effective grounding for lightning protection is a science unto itself; sticking a ground rod into earth doesn't even come close to being sufficient.

Furthermore, no lightning protection system is complete without a properly designed air terminal system, along with associated down conductors and grounding ring. Even after all of these measures, point-of-use transient voltage surge protectors -- devices that essentially commit suicide while protecting the equipment -- need to be installed as close as possible to the equipment being protected.

The failure of the second LIRR tower points to a glaring absence of redundancy or high-reliability design techniques.

All of the above raises serious questions about the LIRR's initial design approval procedures and eventual commissioning and acceptance practices. It is obvious that continuing in the same vein will guarantee future failures not only with lightning but with other safety systems as well.

Finally, why was an Italian company contracted to design a system in America? Don't we have competent engineers here?

Heinz Rosen, Huntington

Editor's note: The writer is an electrical engineer.
 

In the 21st century, how can a total failure of a critical switching system occur? What is the LIRR's business continuity plan when events like lightning strikes occur to critical systems? Shouldn't the critical systems be backed up, along with fail-over redundancy with an uninterrupted power supply, providing energy to these critical systems?

I'd like to see the U.S. Department of Transportation perform an investigation of this incident and the LIRR's contingency planning. Standing for over three hours on the 6:46 p.m. from Penn Station to Babylon, elbow to elbow with no air conditioning and no communication, is intolerable in this day and age.

This incident and response by the LIRR shows their callousness and obtuse feelings toward their customers.

Eric Perrotta, North Massapequa