Carver: Don't deny Nassau cops due process

Much has been written about discipline procedures for police officers in Nassau County, and whether the police commissioner should have sole authority not only to charge police officers with misconduct but also to judge and punish them as he sees fit.

That's akin to a police officer arresting you, overseeing the case he brings against you, deciding your guilt and then handing out the sentence.

The Police Benevolent Association has a legal obligation to represent its members in disciplinary matters and to ensure their due process rights are adequately protected. And we agree that police officers should always be held to a higher standard of conduct than the people we protect each day.

The issue at hand, however, is whether the department's rules are enforced fairly and consistently. Have regulations, orders and penalties been applied without discrimination? Are penalties reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense and employees' records?

For years, the police commissioner had sole authority over all disciplinary functions -- charging, judging and penalizing -- with no review by a neutral third party before imposing such discipline. Over time, the PBA observed that police officers were more harshly penalized than were higher-ranking officers for similar infractions. That's why, in 2004, a neutral arbitration panel granted PBA members binding arbitration as an alternate due process forum, to resolve disciplinary actions when the penalty sought was 10 or more days' pay.

In 2007, both Republican and Democratic members of the County Legislature agreed that this new procedure was needed to ensure that all PBA members were treated equally in the disciplinary process. The legislature approved a change in the county administrative code that made this due process procedure official.

After this unanimous approval by the legislature, the county and the PBA outlined the procedures, so that police officers would have their due process in the event of any charges being served on them. If a disciplinary settlement were not accepted by an officer, he or she had the right to seek binding arbitration to decide the outcome -- with both sides presenting their arguments before a qualified independent arbitrator.

So far, only one case has gone to arbitration (it is currently before the arbitrator). In all other instances, settlements have been finalized with the department's approval -- just as was done before the arbitration process was implemented. Police officers know that arbitrators hold our conduct to the highest level.

Recently, Second Deputy Commissioner William Flanagan and Deputy Chief of Patrol John Hunter were indicted on a charge of derailing the arrest of the son of a police foundation board member. They were allowed to resign with the permission of the police commissioner. They were permitted to collect their full termination pay and to participate in the voluntary separation incentive with no departmental charges filed against them. A spokesman for the Commissioner Thomas Dale stated that they were allowed to retire under a presumption of innocence, because their cases are pending.

These high-ranking officers do deserve the presumption of innocence. And that same presumption should also be applied to lower-ranking officers. In April, Officer Mike Tedesco retired under allegations that he was having an affair while on duty. No criminality was involved, yet the commissioner has refused to grant his termination pay.

The commissioner currently has the full authority he seeks for disciplining higher-ranking members -- yet, at least in these examples, he has used a different standard. It couldn't be more clear why binding arbitration is needed to keep punishments fairly administered.