Pipeline industry largely regulates itself
SAN BRUNO, Calif. - First, the pipeline exploded. Then the flames, like a blowtorch, set the neighborhood overlooking San Francisco Bay ablaze.
Flaming chunks of asphalt hurled into the air from the blast blew through the roof at Bill Magoolaghan's house. As he watched from a nearby hillside in San Bruno, one question came to his mind: Why can't someone stop the tower of fire? "The gas flames were still shooting 300 feet into the air," he recalled thinking, 40 minutes after the Sept. 9 explosion.
One reason is that the line was not equipped with remotely operated or automatic shut-off valves that would have halted the natural gas within minutes of the accident - devices that federal safety officials have recommended to industry and regulators for decades.
An Associated Press investigation found that the utility, Pacific Gas & Electric Co., agreed as far back as 1997 that remotely operated valves did a better job of protecting public safety than manual ones.
But it opted against using them widely across its network of high-pressure transmission lines, saying they weren't necessary or required.
When the flame was finally halted 89 minutes after the explosion, residents were left to survey the damage: eight dead, dozens injured and 55 homes left uninhabitable.
The accident, the AP found, highlights a troubling pattern: A pipeline explodes. Federal investigators call for safety improvements. The government leaves it largely to industry to make safety decisions.
The result is that safety measures are adopted sporadically, sometimes decades later if at all.
Now, as federal investigators prepare for a March hearing on the explosion, lawmakers are pressing for sweeping reforms to a patchwork system of safety regulations.
"It's after an accident that we find there were shortcomings," said Deborah Hersman, head of the National Transportation Safety Board.
While the NTSB is in charge of investigating pipeline accidents, regulators or industry do not have to adopt its recommendations.
After a 1994 gas explosion in Edison, N.J., where it took 2 1/2 hours to shut the manual valves, transportation officials agreed to a study for remotely operated valves, but citing industry suggestions, left out the cost of potential damages or lives lost.
Instead, the agency factored in the cost of lost fuel when pipelines break. The officials ultimately declined to require the valves, saying that they were not cost-effective.
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